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The economics of the built cultural heritage has a particular status in the
field of cultural economics. Heritage goods share some characteristics with
other cultural goods, especially uniqueness and their perception as merit
goods. They differ also from other cultural goods because of durability and
irreversibility: if a historical building is transformed or destroyed, it cannot
be recreated or restored in its initial shape. From this point of view, heri-
tage economics is close to environmental economics. They share the pre-
occupation of sustainability, and the existence of an international demand
linked to tourism.
Heritage goods generate mixed feelings among researchers. Publications
are not so numerous, probably because of many methodological difficul-
ties: empirical issues lack data, and comparative studies are limited by the
very specificity of national situations. Moreover, there is a kind of soft con-
sensus in favour of public regulations, at the same time as subsidization is
criticized for its inefficiency.
Definition
Heritage includes different forms of cultural capital ‘which embodies the
community’s value of its social, historical, or cultural dimension’ (Throsby,
1997, p.15). In this chapter we only emphasize the question of built heri-
tage, in the restrictive sense of immovable heritage, including archaeologi-
cal sites, historical buildings and historic urban centres (or some part of
them). A very simple definition would identify the built heritage as the
buildings and monuments inherited from the past, with a cultural or his-
torical dimension justifying their preservation for future generations, but
also modern monuments whose symbolic or cultural value is high: houses
or buildings designed by a kind of international elite of architects. Even
in this sense, heritage includes a large range of goods, whose definition
changes over time and space and depends on the variety of dimensions
(symbolic, cultural, national identity-oriented, social and suchlike) in-
cluded in the concept (Chastel, 1986). Therefore heritage is a social con-
struction whose boundaries are unstable and blurred, with a twofold source
of extension: historical additions and enlargement of the concept of heri-
tage towards additional items (gardens, industrial buildings, and so on).
Peacock (1997, p.195) argues in favour of a Beckerian definition of heritage
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as ‘an intangible service increasing the utility of consumers, in which historic
buildings and artefacts are inputs’. Such a definition recognizes the existence
of substitutes for goods that have some characteristics in common. This con-
ception presents the advantage of including services offered through new
technologies, provided that the consumer considers a visit through new tech-
nologies (CDRom, Internet) a satisfying substitute for a ‘real’ use.
One can oppose an institutional definition (the official listing of histori-
cal buildings) and a more informal definition (what art historians or mere
citizens think should be maintained and preserved). Different institutional
definitions of heritage may be distinguished also, depending on the level of
the administration in charge of them: from a small city mayor deciding to
undertake restoration of a little rural church, to an international organiza-
tion like UNESCO providing lists of artefacts that it considers as the basis
of an international human patrimony. Local or national authorities may be
in opposition to international demand. Contrary to Klamer and Throsby
(2000), preservation is never obvious, as we have recently seen with the
Taliban’s destruction of the giant sculptures of the Buddha, but also with
the recurrent debate about the spoliation and restitution of parts of monu-
ments (as in the case of the Parthenon friezes and their storage in the
British Museum) or with the controversial question of destroying or pre-
serving urban centres built in the 1950s.
Characteristics of cultural heritage
Cultural heritage has public good characteristics. Firstly, indivisibility gen-
erally prevails: the consumption of publicly-owned goods is a priori iden-
tical for all consumers provided that the monuments – especially their
façades – represent joint, non-rival goods. Nevertheless, congestion may
occur for overcrowded monuments, at a risk: degradation, especially for
‘superstar’ sites or monuments (Venice, Mont Saint Michel, Statue of
Liberty, Tower of Pisa, Angkor and so on), threatens buildings that attract
too many visitors. For these monuments, reputation increases with the
number of users, creating network externalities.
Secondly, externalities are a source of market failure. First of all, exter-
nalities concern the fact that heritage constitutes a legacy to be passed on
to future generations (bequest value). Heritage also confers benefits on
individual citizens, who have not contributed to their production or pres-
ervation. Many economists also emphasize the spillover effects of histori-
cal monuments for local activities and tourism. Moreover, excludability is
not always possible or desirable. Greffe (1999) addresses the question
whether to charge a price or not (when possible). He analyses price discrim-
ination policies in heritage buildings and sites, emphasizing the lack of
clarity that results from the large variety of policies.
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These characteristics constitute a strong argument for public funding in
order to correct market failure, and for the impossibility of grounding the
choice of preservation solely on market forces (Mossetto, 1994; Koboldt,
1997).
The market value of historical buildings: some methodological questions
One of the greatest difficulties is the evaluation of demand and supply.
Tools are available to evaluate heritage demand and the willingness to pay.
Contingent valuation methods value consumer preferences that people
place on heritage. Different biases are inherent to this survey-based meth-
odology, especially ‘free-riding’, that can be explained by the collectively
owned nature of certain goods as described above. Referenda have the
advantage of combining the evaluation of competing alternatives with
democratic decisions. They are routinely undertaken in Switzerland (Frey,
1997). The travel cost method is based on the hypothesis that the cost of
travel (including time opportunity cost) to heritage sites is a satisfactory
proxy for the visitors’ willingness to pay. Such a method underestimates
demand by excluding non-users. The hedonic pricing method is theoreti-
cally much more convincing. According to this method, a building is con-
sidered as a bundle of characteristics. It estimates the differences in value
of buildings with a set of identical characteristics, but located in two differ-
ent areas (listed and non-listed), considering that the price of a property
can be viewed as the sum of the shadow prices of its characteristics.
Unfortunately, many difficulties arise for the estimation of hedonic prices
(Stabler, 1995).
It has been suggested that the utility of preserving the past increases with
the age of consumers, especially in the case of rapid social and economic
change, when national identities seem threatened by changes. Therefore the
intensity of demand varies according to a series of factors, such as access,
revenues, price and age.
The market value of historical buildings includes the possibility of prop-
erty rental. It may differ greatly from the scientific value (as the object of
study) and communication value (the social significance of heritage, its aes-
thetical and commercial value); a property with zero market value, except
that of the land (such as a country church), can have very great scientific
value. Heritage goods have option value and existence value also. Option
value is defined by what the non-user is ready to pay in order to preserve
the possibility of benefit from an asset in the future. Existence value is
obvious when individuals gain utility from the mere existence of cultural
goods that they do not directly consume.
Costs of restoration and upkeep are high, since listing implies the
hiring of skilled labour and the use of rare and hence expensive building
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materials (Benhamou, 1996). Those costs increase with the stock of heri-
tage. One can argue that nobody can anticipate the test of time. This uncer-
tainty implies the broadest preservation policy possible, taking into
account that present-day preferences of consumers may differ markedly
from future preferences. But the vast financial burden of preservation
imposes the need to select a set of buildings from among the large variety
of possibilities and claims. Two kinds of criteria coexist: objective criteria,
like the age of the building, its state of conservation and the emergency, and
subjective criteria, like the definition of the experts themselves, who give the
imprimatur to heritage goods. With subjective criteria, there is a risk of a
conventional and self-referential process (Throsby, 2001), given that crite-
ria are not well established and may be imposed by experts for their own
benefit: regulators have their own preference functions which they impose
on the public; in such a case, the capture of regulators, as for other public
utilities, leads to an oversupply of heritage.
Heritage supplies jointly produced outputs. This feature increases the
problems of evaluating the performance of public or private suppliers.
Regulations
When the stock of cultural items is large, the marginal value of a specific
item is low (Hutter, 1997; Netzer, 1998); that is an explanation for the low
level of preservation in Italy. The problem in Italy is probably merely due
to the huge costs of preservation in that country. Among policy issues,
Throsby (2001) makes the contrast between ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ regulations.
Soft regulations open up the possibility of relatively large tax incentives and
subsidization, or mere agreements, while hard regulations include enforce-
able legal restrictions on use, exchange and transformation.
Listing requires owners to conform with a series of constraints that range
from restrictions on alteration and demolition, and supervision of works
by public experts, with the requirement that the work be done by approved
contractors. Moreover, in many countries, inheritance tax deductions are
submitted on the opening of the property to the public during a defined
period. Therefore regulation creates an incentive to reveal the existence of
heritage goods and to provide services to the public. But regulation also
creates an incentive to apply for subsidies: moral hazard occurs, creating a
collective propensity to produce more heritage than would be preserved in
a free market situation (Benhamou, 1996). Individuals asymmetrically
weight losses and gains in the case of heritage, and therefore have a natural
propensity to apply for preservation. Social costs of preservation may be
much higher than is socially desirable.
Theoretically, bestowing on a monument a mark of architectural quality
increases its market value. But a study conducted in the UK in 1993 did not
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find any substantial change in the commercial value. Does listing increase
market value of buildings? Research findings in Great Britain (Creigh-Tyte,
2000) compare returns of listed and unlisted office properties over the
period 1980–95. According to Creigh-Tyte, values of listed properties built
before 1974 match or exceed their unlisted equivalents. Moreover, the old-
est (pre-1945) listed properties slightly exceed the return for all properties.
Unfortunately, data collected in this survey only concern offices and not
residential buildings.
Listing probably gives birth to a twofold effect on value (higher value
because of symbolic significance versus lower value because of a loss result-
ing from the opportunity costs of delay and constraints). Subsidies should
compensate for the loss only when it occurs.
An alternative way of analysing the question of the effects of listing on
market value consists in taking into account property rights allocation.
Different individuals may own distinct attributes of the same commodity
(Barzel, 1997). Thus, among the multiple attributes of a historical building,
some are related to the private owner, and others have to be shared with
others, because they are a part of the national collective heritage. Therefore
restrictions on the owner’s behaviour are imposed in order to protect the
rights of the other citizens, and public authorities capture a part of the
property rights because of the inherent heritage quality of the property.
The state and the owners share the responsibility for restoring registered
monuments, as is observed in most countries.
Sable and Kling (2001) identify a double public good feature also: his-
torical assets enter into household utility functions and contribute to the
public externality of ‘shared experience’. The twofold nature argument
applies better to façades than to interiors; the idea of preserving only
the façades gave birth to a very questionable preservation choice named
‘façadism’, consisting in preserving the integrity of façades and freely re-
organizing the interiors, with owners free to adapt their properties to mod-
ern life. Art historians generally criticize such an exercise, considering that
it implies a loss of cultural value. This question of quality is emphasized by
Mossetto (1992), who shows the voluntaristic nature of goods that people
wish to keep unchanged for centuries, as in the case of Venice. In the same
way, re-use responds to cost concerns, by creating value (Mossetto and
Vecco, 2001), but is always susceptible to threatening the historical quality
of a site. As in the Baumolian cost disease case for the performing arts,
economizing costs may lead to a decrease in quality.
An interesting debate concerns the degree of restoration. Are identical
reproductions of the past stimulating solutions, or should each period leave
the signs of its conceptions of the way to preserve the past, as in the case
of Viollet le Duc architectural restorations? This question is close to that
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of inalienability. When historical buildings are publicly owned, are there
any possibilities to apply market forces in order to diminish the weight of
preservation for taxpayers? The same issue concerns some works of art in
the storage of public museums (de-accessioning). From this point of view
the question of the preservation of non-moveable heritage (providing fixed-
location services) shares many aspects with moveable artefacts.
Peacock (1998) denies the existence of inalienable rights for the preser-
vation of buildings that would lead each generation to preserve a stock
equivalent to that which it has inherited. This intertemporal redistribution
issue relies on the assumption that future consumers will cover the costs of
such an accumulation. He adds that there are no grounds that justify
‘[forcing] present generations, especially in poor countries, to make the
implied sacrifices in terms of the alternative use of resources in the expec-
tation – which could be falsified – that future generations will perceive extra
benefits from a bequest of historical artefacts at the expense of other forms
of physical capital’ (Peacock, 1997, p.229).
The question is more complicated when taking into account the interna-
tional concern for the preservation of other countries’ heritage. According
to Netzer (1998), there are cases in which foreigners are ready to contrib-
ute to preservation, because of option, existence or bequest values. Inter-
national demand for heritage services in numerous poor countries is
undersupplied when financing preservation depends only on the national
decision-making process.
Private versus public, local versus central 
A large part of cultural heritage remains in private hands. Mossetto (1994)
notes the existence of three different levels for the extent of preservation:
re-use, (partial) restoration and preservation. In the two first cases the
market works adequately, while public regulation is unavoidable in the third
case. One of the specific problems is the risk linked to the two first cases:
without any intervention, heritage may be radically transformed and its
long-term value reduced by the loss of its historical characteristics.
Privatization is often presented as a solution in order to limit public
expenditure. Whatever the case, public funding may be added to private
finance. Public funding helps listed buildings’ owners to undertake works
and preserve the property as a whole. Therefore a mixture of private and
public finance should not be opposed. There are private altruistic solutions,
in the case of non-profit institutions in charge of heritage (like the National
Trust in the United Kingdom) and friends’ associations. Another form of
private altruism relies on the proportion of voluntary labour in this field.
The National Lottery has been mainly developed in the United Kingdom,
but, in such a case, taxpayers are replaced by gambling groups, leading to
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a regressive effect (Peacock, 1997). Final choices depend on the context, on
the nature and extent of externalities.
Some debates emphasize a second opposition between local and central
support. According to Peacock, devolution towards funding by regional
and local authorities would increase the individual involvement in the deci-
sion-making process. But the legitimacy of devolution depends on the type
of monument concerned. A case study of Sicily shows that devolution has
not diminished the gap between local voter preferences and those of policy
makers: while administrative responsibility relies on local authorities, funds
still come from central authorities (Rizzo, 2002).
Final remarks
The economics of built heritage does not live in a ghetto only concerned
with the question of preserving the past. Economists help policy makers to
find appropriate solutions when intellectual property rights intervene in
the decision process: for example, when every image of the ‘Pyramide du
Louvre’ designed by Pei provides royalties to its architect. Economists may
value the way new technologies increase the market value of monuments,
by enlarging the circle of their potential users (as in the case of the record
industry for the performing arts). Economists have to undertake more
studies on the impact of regulation on supply and demand behaviours.
Many stimulating avenues for further research are still open in this field.
See also:
Chapter 14: Contingent valuation; Chapter 19: Cultural capital; Chapter 52: Regulation.
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